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Abstract The emergence of technology-oriented agreements such as the 2005 Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) may have significant
implications for the future of global climate governance, as these agreements could be
perceived as an alternative for the existing international climate regime. It is, therefore,
important to examine what has moved countries to be involved in these agreements
alongside the UN climate regime. This article seeks to identify possible factors contrib-
uting to Japan’s participation in both the UN climate regime and the APP, looking at the
position of domestic interest groups, the distribution of climate policy-making at the
government level and varying international pressures. It concludes that Japan’s partici-
pation in both the APP and the UN climate regime flows from a policy-making process that
tries to accommodate conflicting viewpoints at the domestic and international levels. To
what extent Japan’s participation in both fora can be regarded as constructive will depend
on the partnership’s ability to support the implementation of a future climate regime.
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1 Introduction
Global governance in the field of climate change is characterised by an increasing diversity
in arrangements that aim to address the problem. While the bulk of international rules
addressing climate change is still to be found in the 1992 United Nations Framework
H. van Asselt (&)
Department of Environmental Policy Analysis, Institute for Environmental Studies,
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1087, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: harro.van.asselt@ivm.vu.nl
N. Kanie  M. Iguchi
Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision
Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan
123
Int Environ Agreements (2009) 9:319–336
DOI 10.1007/s10784-009-9098-6
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a plethora of
novel governance arrangements has emerged in the last few years, involving not only
nation states but also non-state actors including business, civil society and local and
regional government authorities (Jagers and Stripple 2003; Ba¨ckstrand 2008; Pattberg and
Stripple 2008; Biermann et al. 2009, in press). Some of these arrangements involve gov-
ernments that are at the same time engaged in climate change negotiations under the UN
umbrella. The question then arises what the relation is between the commitments of these
governments under the UN framework and their activities in other fora. Against this
background, the aim of this article is to identify the underlying factors that moved one
country, Japan, to position itself in between the UN climate regime and one of the most
prominent new governance arrangements, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Devel-
opment and Climate (APP).
Less than half a year after the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force, six countries—the
United States, Japan, Australia, China, India and the Republic of Korea—announced the
APP in July 2005 (see Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and van Asselt 2009, this issue). The coun-
tries proposed to address climate change mitigation and a range of other concerns through a
voluntary, non-legally binding and technology-oriented approach. In 2007, the group was
joined by Canada. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol with its focus on absolute greenhouse
gas emission reduction targets, the APP focuses primarily on the development and
deployment of clean technologies in combination with market-based instruments such as
emissions trading. Although its founders stressed that the APP was ‘complementary’ to the
Kyoto Protocol, there has been debate over the extent to which it actually was formed to
become an alternative to the legally binding framework under the Protocol (McGee and
Taplin 2006; Christoff and Eckersley 2007; Lawrence 2007; van Asselt 2007).
When the Partnership was established, Japan was in a unique position as it was the only
country in the APP group that at the same time had committed to a greenhouse gas emission
reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. Australia and the United States were also
among the developed (Annex I) countries in the UNFCCC, but had refrained from ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol. China, India and the Republic of Korea had ratified the Protocol, but
were not subject to legally binding quantified emission reduction commitments. Japan, in
contrast, had committed itself under the Protocol to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by
6% from 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. As a participant in both agreements, Japan
thus has a high stake in the direction of the future (post-2012) institutional framework on
climate change. In that sense, it is not alone anymore, as Canada, which joined the APP
later, is also bound by a binding emission reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.
Furthermore, after a change of government at the end of 2007, Australia also ratified the
Kyoto Protocol. Still, Japan’s position is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the country
has a special interest in the success of the Kyoto Protocol, with the treaty being named after
the former capital city.1 Second, Japan played a critical role in forging consensus on the
Bonn Agreement in 2000–2001, when there was mounting concern regarding the future of
the Kyoto Protocol due to the United States’ decision not to ratify (Broadbent 2002).2
Third, Japan is one of the world’s major emitters of greenhouse gases, and is the second-
largest economy in the world. Fourth, the country has historically attempted to maintain
1 Tiberghien and Schreurs (2007, p. 88) note the symbolic importance of the fact that the agreement was
concluded in a Japanese city.
2 The Bonn Agreement, which was reached in 2001 at the second part of the sixth Conference of the Parties
to the UNFCCC (COP-6bis), managed to provide new impetus to the climate regime, after negotiations at
COP-6 in The Hague in 2000 failed.
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good relations with the main non-Party to the Kyoto Protocol, the US (Matsumura 2000;
Miyaoka 2004). Fifth, Japan has interests in exerting political leadership in Asia, as the
region ‘is the basis for its economic activities as well as for establishing an appropriate
position in international society’ (Matsumura 2000, p. 66).
This article seeks to explain why Japan navigates between the UN climate regime and
the APP and to shed some light on the country’s position in the negotiations under the
UNFCCC about a future institutional framework for climate change policy. Japan has
neither fully embraced Kyoto’s cap-and-trade approach nor has it outright rejected it in
favour of technology-oriented governance arrangements such as the APP. This article
explores different possible explanations, looking at the position of domestic interest
groups, the distribution of climate policy-making competencies at the government level
and varying international pressures. It concludes that Japan’s participation in both fora is
the result of a difficult process of trying to accommodate conflicting viewpoints at the
domestic and international levels. Furthermore, depending on the extent to which the APP
is able to support the implementation of a post-2012 climate regime, the decision to be
involved in both the APP and the UN climate regime might actually be seen as conducive
to the effectiveness of global climate governance.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the current state
of affairs in Japanese domestic climate policy. Section 3 examines Japan’s role in the UN
climate regime and initiatives outside of it, paying specific attention to the APP. Section 4
then moves on to investigate the factors that contributed to Japan’s participation in both the
APP and the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, Sect. 5 summarises the analysis, and provides some
concluding thoughts.
2 Japanese domestic climate policy: an overview
Japan is one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters in the world, after the United States,
China, the EU-25, Russia and India (Baumert et al. 2005, p. 12), and its emissions are still
on the rise. In 2006, Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions grew by 6.2% from their 1990
levels (MOE 2008). As Japan’s Kyoto target is -6% from 1990 levels, this means that
Japan is now obliged to cut emissions by 12.2% from 2006 levels during the first com-
mitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Although the Japanese population has started to
decrease since 2005, the rise in greenhouse gas emissions is still expected to continue.
Additional measures are thus required to achieve the 6% reduction target (Kameyama
2008).
Climate change policy in Japan evolved in response to international policy develop-
ments. After the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, the Guideline of Measures to
Prevent Global Warming was announced in June 1998 (MOE 1998) by the newly estab-
lished Global Warming Prevention Headquarters, which was headed by the prime minister,
and was mandated to coordinate policy measures among relevant ministries and govern-
ment agencies. This Guideline formed the core of Japan’s climate policy. It did not
introduce new policy measures, but was rather a list of existing policies at the time, as the
operational details of the Kyoto Protocol had not yet been made clear. The Guideline was
revised in June 2002 after the Marrakech Accords were agreed upon in 2001. The revised
Guideline took a step forward in setting emission reduction targets and introducing policy
measures for different sectors. The next step was taken after the Kyoto Protocol’s entry
into force on 16 February 2005. The Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan was
introduced in April 2005 ‘in order to stipulate the measures necessary to reliably achieve
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the target of a 6% reduction promised by Japan under the Kyoto Protocol’.3 By then, the
Plan included more detailed policies and measures. It reported that the industrial sector had
made some progress, while other sectors such as transportation, households and business
were considered to be areas where emission reductions still needed to be attained.
More than a decade after their establishment, the Headquarters have not yet been able to
exert strong leadership in coordinating between the different ministries with a view to
agreeing on a common, consolidated climate policy position (Fisher 2004; Kameyama
2008). Traditionally, there have been two conflicting perspectives within the country,
which have developed in parallel and have been advocated by different ministries, namely
the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of
Environment (MOE) (e.g. Takeuchi 1998; Kawashima 2000; Fisher 2004; Oshitani 2006).
In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) coordinates the country’s interna-
tional position on climate change, meaning that there are thus three main players at the
government level. METI has a strong history of contributing to the economic growth of the
Japanese industry sector, making it one of the most competitive in the world, and it has
acted as an important contact point between industry and government bureaucracy. One of
its main interests has been to protect and promote the competitiveness of the Japanese
industry. MOE, on the other hand, is a relatively young institution. Established in 1971 as
an agency, it was upgraded to a ministry only in 2001. MOE is responsible for coordinating
environmental affairs. However, it is in a rather weak position compared to other minis-
tries, due to its low financial and human resources. Therefore, MOE is often not able to
effectively coordinate government deliberations on environmental issues. Due to the
substantive differences in position between the three ministries involved and the lack of
effective coordination mechanisms, the government’s foreign policy on climate change has
been both ambiguous and fragmented (Takeuchi 1998; Hattori 1999). At times, Japan put
itself in an awkward position, having two distinct speakers with different views speaking
up on behalf of the same government in the international negotiations. The run-up to the
Kyoto conference in 1997 was an important exception in this context, as the Prime
Minister’s Cabinet Office intervened in the process and forged a common position just in
time before the summit.
These diverging views notwithstanding, there are some signs of progress. Japanese
Prime Ministers in the past few years have each taken action on the issue of climate change
(see Table 1). Most notably, in 2008, Prime Minister Fukuda announced a long-term
Japanese emission reduction target of 60–80% from current levels by 2050, after having
been criticised by international NGOs for rejecting a strong quantified emission reduction
commitment at the climate conference in Bali in 2007. In addition, the discussions on a
Japanese emissions trading scheme have picked up steam. Following Fukuda’s initiative, a
trial emissions trading scheme was started in 2008 (Fukuda 2008). The Japanese gov-
ernment has not been able to agree on a medium-term target for the country going beyond
its Kyoto cap, in contrast with, for example, the EU. Nevertheless, Environment Minister
Tetsuo Saito proposed in January 2009 that Japan should set a medium-term target of
reducing its emissions within the range of 25–40% as suggested by the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR4), and this issue is at
present under consideration.4
3 Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan. Retrieved January 20, 2009, from http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/policy/kyoto/050428plan_e.pdf.
4 Mainichi Shinbun, 30 January 2009.
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In sum, it can be seen that Japanese domestic climate policy has been characterised by
difficulties in achieving consensus between government actors. However, policy devel-
opments have inched forward by initiatives taken by consecutive Prime Ministers. Most
notably, Japan’s long-term ‘vision’ is the result of Shinzo Abe’s ‘Cool Earth 50’ plan,
whereas Prime Ministers Fukuda and Aso have made first steps towards introducing a
domestic emissions trading scheme and setting a mid-term target.
3 Japan and international climate policy
Having sketched the domestic context for Japanese climate policy, we now move on to
Japan’s position in international discussions on future international climate governance.
We first describe Japan’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations. We then explore Japan’s
role in other initiatives, most notably the Major Economies Process and the Group of 8
(G8) process, which both played an important role in bringing the climate change issue to
the attention of Japanese Prime Ministers. Finally, we provide an overview of Japan’s
involvement in the APP.
3.1 Japan and the post-2012 UN climate negotiations
Starting with the Montre´al summit in 2005, questions about the shape of global climate
governance beyond 2012 have moved to centre stage in the UNFCCC process. Particularly
important in this regard is the issue of mid-term and long-term target setting. Negotiations
on a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol were formally launched at the 13th
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007. After
intense negotiations, Parties to the UNFCCC finally adopted a series of decisions together
referred to as the ‘Bali Road Map’. The key decision, known as the Bali Action Plan
(UNFCCC 2008a, b), constitutes an important landmark in the development of interna-
tional climate policy. However, the decision avoids any explicit reference to a quantitative
elaboration of a long-term objective, and does not go further than calling for ‘deep
[emission] cuts’. It also does not indicate specific ranges for short- to medium-term targets
as the IPCC AR4 suggested. Japan, together with the United States and Canada, was
Table 1 Japanese Prime Ministers and domestic climate policy
Period Prime Minister Main climate policy initiatives
April 2001–
September 2006
Junichiro
Koizumi
Initiated the ‘Cool Biz Campaign’: wear no tie in summer
and warm clothes in winter
Failed in attempt to introduce climate change-motivated
environmental tax
September 2006–2007 Shinzo Abe Introduced ‘Cool Earth 50’: halving global greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050 from ‘current’ levels
September 2007–2008 Yasuo Fukuda Introduced the ‘Fukuda Vision’, which includes the
introduction
of a pilot emission trading scheme in autumn 2008;
a long-term target of 60–80% emission reductions from
current levels by 2050; and the pre-announcement of a
mid-term target
September 2008–present Taro Aso Establishment of a ‘Mid-term Target Committee’(Cabinet
Secretariat)
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initially one of the countries opposing the inclusion of any numerical targets in the
decision, although it changed its position after the Bali conference (Cle´menc¸on 2008). The
decision leaves open a wide range of possibilities of how a post-2012 agreement might
look, and does not clarify whether such an agreement will include binding emission
reduction targets for developed countries (Rajamani 2008).
In its submissions to the various bodies under the UNFCCC, Japan has provided an
outline of its post-2012 negotiating position. First, in line with the ‘Cool Earth 50’ strategy,
the Japanese government has proposed a non-legally binding ‘shared long-term vision’ of
at least halving global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (UNFCCC 2008c, d). Second,
Japan emphasises the importance of promoting technological innovation through, among
others, expanding investment in research and development, and strengthening frameworks
for international cooperation (UNFCCC 2008c). Third, Japan has been one of the
staunchest supporters of including a ‘sectoral approach’ in a future climate agreement.
What exactly it meant with such an approach was long unclear, but recent submissions
shed some light on Japan’s ideas (UNFCCC 2008c, d). Essentially, under the ‘cooperative
sectoral approach’ envisaged by Japan, countries would engage in a bottom-up process of
setting quantified mid-term emission reduction targets, by aggregating abatement in a
number of sectors. Such calculations could then serve as a basis for negotiating numerical
caps for all the countries. These sectoral emission reduction potentials are in turn calcu-
lated by factors such as the technology to be used, mitigation potential and expected
production. The sectoral approach also entails identifying ‘best practices’ for each sector
and conducting technology needs assessments in developing countries. Whether the sectors
would be assigned specific targets remains unclear. Fourth, Japan has called for ‘mean-
ingful participation’ of all the major emitters (UNFCCC 2007). In this context, it favours
differentiation among developing (non-Annex I) countries on the basis of specific criteria
(e.g. income per capita and share of global emissions). The sectoral approach proposed by
Japan applies to both developed and developing countries—in particular the major emit-
ters—although different economic and geographical circumstances are taken into account
(UNFCCC 2008c). The Japanese push for a sectoral approach stems from the concern that
the country’s leading import and export markets are China and the US, which both do not
have binding numerical targets under the current climate regime. Furthermore, the sectoral
approach allows Japanese actors to emphasise their relative high efficiency—and hence,
limited potential for further emissions abatement—in certain sectors.
The various elements proposed by Japan in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations
also play an important role in the country’s activities in non-UN initiatives, as we will see
below.
3.2 Japan and non-UN climate change initiatives
A number of international climate change-related initiatives have been started outside of the
UNFCCC process, taking a different approach than the climate regime. The existence of a
variety of governance arrangements could exert both a positive and negative influence on
the efforts under the UNFCCC umbrella (Biermann et al. 2009, in press; Kanie 2007). On
the positive side, overlapping approaches could lead to policy innovation through compe-
tition. On the other hand, the mere existence of these voluntary, non-binding arrangements
could reduce the incentive to participate in the UN climate regime (McGee and Taplin 2006;
van Asselt 2007). A host of different approaches to international climate policy could also
reduce the overall consistency and coherence in global climate governance. Given these
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possible synergies and conflicts, developments outside of the UN climate regime are
potentially relevant in shaping the future of global climate governance.
Although Japan actively participates in the post-2012 negotiations under the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol, it is also involved in several international non-UN arrangements.
Japan’s role in the APP is described in the next section. Here we briefly discuss Japan’s
role in two other prominent non-UN fora: the G8 climate change dialogue and the Major
Economies Meeting.5
In July 2005, the G8 initiated a three-year Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy
and Sustainable Development at a meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland (Karlsson 2009).6 The
Dialogue not only included the G8 countries, but also engages five major developing
countries—Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (‘G8?5’). Also in this venue,
long-term climate targets have received greater attention since the 2007 G8 Summit in
Heiligendamm, Germany. Just before the summit, then Prime Minister Abe announced his
‘Cool Earth 50’ plan, which involved halving greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. This
influenced the chair’s summary of the summit, which stated that the G8 countries ‘will
consider seriously the decisions made by the European Union, Canada and Japan which
include at least a halving of global emissions by 2050’ (G8 2007). The process became of
great importance to Japan when it hosted the G8 meeting in Toyako in July 2008. In the
run-up to the summit, Japan tried to convince other G8 countries of its long-term vision, as
it wanted to further develop the G8 statement from the previous year and present a result
for ‘serious consideration’ of a long-term target under its chairmanship of the G8 Summit
(Kanie 2008). It also promoted the usefulness of a sectoral approach in post-2012 climate
policy (Point Carbon 2008). Although countries like Germany and the United Kingdom
were supportive of the long-term goal, the Americans were more reluctant to accept a
quantified long-term objective. Eventually, Japan more or less got its way, and the
countries present—including the US—agreed ‘to share (…) the vision (…) of the goal’ to
at least halve global emissions by 2050, although without specifying a base year (G8 2008,
para. 23). On sectoral approaches, however, Japan did not achieve the full endorsement it
had sought: G8 leaders merely regarded sectoral approaches as ‘useful tools to improve
energy efficiency and reduce emissions through dissemination of existing and new tech-
nologies in a manner compatible with economic growth’ (G8 2008, para. 24).
Japan also participated in the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and
Climate Change (MEM), which was launched by the United States in September 2007 and
included 17 of the world’s largest economies. Like the G8 process, the MEM became of
significance to Japan in the run-up to its hosting of the G8 summit in 2008. At the meeting
in Japan, countries agreed to ‘promote the exchange of mitigation information and analysis
on sectoral efficiency, the identification of national technology needs and voluntary,
action-oriented international cooperation, and consider the role of cooperative sectoral
approaches and sector-specific actions’ (MEM 2008). For Japan, the APP is one of the
examples of ‘voluntary, action-oriented international cooperation’.7 There was thus some
recognition of the usefulness of sectoral approaches, which Japan has also been pressing
5 Other initiatives that Japan is involved in include: International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy;
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum; Global Nuclear Energy Partnership; International Partnership for
Energy Efficiency Cooperation; Generation IV International Forum; and the International Energy Agency’s
Implementing Agreements.
6 The members of the G8 are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the US.
7 Discussion Paper, 2nd International workshop on sectoral emission reduction potential (Paris, 22nd
October 2008), organised by government of Japan. Retrieved January 20, 2009, from http://www.env.go.
jp/en/earth/cc/2nd_iwserp.html.
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for in its submissions to the UNFCCC (Vihma 2009, this issue). However, contrary to the
G8 summit, the countries were not able to agree on a quantified long-term goal.
3.3 Japan and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
Japan’s preference for sectoral approaches to climate change mitigation is arguably most
visible in its participation in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (APP). The APP is a non-legally binding ‘compact’, aiming ‘to meet (…)
increased energy needs and associated challenges, including those related to air pollution,
energy security, and greenhouse gas intensities’ (APP Charter 2006, para. 1.1). The
countries participating in the APP intend to achieve their goals through international
cooperation with a view to the development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of clean,
efficient and cost-effective technologies (APP Charter 2006, para. 2.1.1).
Amongst the original six participating nations, Japan was the last one to join the APP,
and only at the very last minute.8 Initially, the US White House Council on Environmental
Quality feared that Japan would push for emission reduction targets and other ‘Kyoto-like
‘‘anti-growth’’’ provisions.9 When it joined, the Japanese government emphasised that the
APP was complementary to the Kyoto Protocol, and that it saw the APP as a way of
promoting cooperation on climate and energy issues in the Asia-Pacific region.10 In a press
statement, a representative of MOE stated that ‘Kyoto remains in place, and the new
initiative focuses on transferring technology to developing countries’.11 Furthermore, the
Japanese government has referred to the APP as a positive example of (sectoral) coop-
eration in its submissions to the UNFCCC, emphasising its potential to diffuse clean and
efficient technologies developed in Japan (e.g. UNFCCC 2008e). Moreover, it has argued
that the practical work carried out in the context of the APP could form the basis for its
‘cooperative sectoral approach’ as proposed in the post-2012 negotiations. In particular,
Japan suggests that the APP could support in the calculation of sectoral emission reduction
potential (UNFCCC 2008d).
Although the partnership is not aimed at any technology or sector in particular, at
the inaugural meeting held in Sydney in January 2006, eight areas were singled out for
the establishment of ‘task forces’: (1) aluminium, (2) buildings and appliances, (3) cement,
(4) cleaner fossil energy, (5) coal mining, (6) power generation and transmission, (7)
renewable energy and distributed generation and (8) steel. Japan chairs the cement and
steel task forces, which are both hosted by METI. In addition, Japan proposed to establish a
new task force for the road transport sector in 2008.12
A closer look at the various APP project descriptions shows that most projects are
designed to facilitate transboundary sectoral interactions through, for example, exchanging
specialists or conducting joint sector analyses. Despite its last-minute inclusion, Japan has
become an avid proponent of the APP. The Japanese government (or in various cases a
Japanese private organisation) is involved in over 30 projects. In the steel task force, Japan
8 Interview with WWF Japan representatives, 3 April 2007.
9 United States Department of State internal memo (on file with authors).
10 See, e.g., http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20061101001/app-press-release.pdf (in Japanese) (retrieved
January 20, 2009).
11 MOE representative Akio Takemoto, quoted in Risk Spectrum Magazine. Retrieved January 20, 2009,
from http://www.riskspectrum.com/_pdf/RSMagJan06.pdf, p. 8.
12 See Japan, Proposal for the establishment of an APP road transport Task Force (on file with authors).
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manages two projects. The first project seeks to review a number of indicators for energy
saving in the sector. The second project consists of a ‘diagnosis’ of several steel plants in
China and India (APP 2008). In the cement task force, Japan is involved in developing
benchmarks, as well as analysing the efficiency of cement kilns in China and India (APP
2006). The Japanese government is optimistic about the information exchange through the
APP: ‘To maintain (…) high efficiency over a long period of time, the industry has
developed various methodologies and know-how of operation, maintenance and man-
agement. Sharing them with the engineers of participating countries makes it possible for
Japan to contribute to global-scale reduction in greenhouse gas emissions’ (UNFCCC
2008e, p. 12). It remains to be seen, however, whether and to what extent the data col-
lection and information exchange activities eventually will lead to actual emission
reductions.
Although the APP was agreed upon by governments, it foresees a crucial role for the
private sector in the implementation of activities. By directly involving important actors
that ultimately need to reduce their emissions—business and industry—it arguably
addresses one of the weaknesses that critics have pointed out for the intergovernmental UN
climate regime (Kellow 2006). The APP aims to promote information exchange within the
private sector, and to establish procedures to identify, evaluate and to provide solutions for
the challenges and obstacles faced in technology development. Nevertheless, the APP still
requires the indispensable support of the various governments (Pezzey et al. 2006, p. 5).
On the one hand, the APP has a number of characteristics that fit well with the Japanese
position in the post-2012 discussions in the UN climate regime: (1) its focus on emissions
in specific large emitting sectors that are subject to international competition, (2) the
emphasis on technological innovation and the transfer of clean technologies and practices,
and (3) the participation of other major emitters (China, India and the US) in climate
change mitigation efforts. On the other hand, it also lacks some of the elements that Japan
has embraced in the UN context. Notably, APP activities are not linked to any long-term
objective for global emission reductions. Whereas a long-term ‘vision’ is now being dis-
cussed in the UNFCCC, the G8 and the MEM processes, the APP refrains from mentioning
any quantified objective, not even as an aspirational target. Furthermore, the sectoral
approach of the APP differs from the one that Japan advocates in the UNFCCC discus-
sions. In the APP, sectoral activities are voluntary in nature, whereas Japan’s proposal in
the climate regime intends to use sectoral analysis as the basis for a country’s (legally
binding) commitments (see UNFCCC 2008c). The differences between approaches of the
APP and the UN climate regime raise the question of why the country is active in the
different fora. The next section examines three possible explanations for Japan’s partici-
pation in the APP alongside the UN negotiations.
4 Explaining Japan’s participation in the UN climate regime and the APP
4.1 Interest group politics: engaging business while reassuring civil society
One of the first plausible explanations for Japan’s choice to participate in both the Kyoto
Protocol and the APP lies in domestic interest group politics. Japanese industry, of which
about 80% is united in the Federation of Economic Organizations (FEO or Nippon
Keidanren), have historically been a powerful interest group, with strong ties to the leading
political party (LDP) and METI (Okimoto 1989). Their power is also visible in domestic
climate politics, as Fisher (2004, p. 73) argues: ‘The regulation of climate change in Japan
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is a case in point that the government has only taken steps that are approved by industry’.
In the 1990s, Keidanren pre-empted the outcomes of the Kyoto negotiations by announcing
its own voluntary action plan in 1997. The plan was established at least in part out of fear
of possible government regulations (Matsumura 2000). Although Keidanren did not
explicitly consult with the government in drawing up the plan, the government later
approved it (Schroeder 2003), and policy measures for the industry sector in Japan have
been based on Keidanren’s voluntary action plan (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007).
Keidanren has strongly opposed government interventions, including the use of eco-
nomic instruments such as carbon taxes and emissions trading (Nippon Keidanren 2007).
Their main rationale is that the costs imposed would damage the competitiveness of
Japanese industry on the international market, especially given a situation where both the
largest import (China) and export (the US) markets are not subject to emission caps. This
situation would arguably result in the relocation of production and jobs abroad, and would
thus harm the overall economy (Miyaoka 2004). After the US withdrew from Kyoto in
2001, industry representatives called the Protocol a failure for allowing the largest emitter
to walk away so easily (Nippon Keidanren 2001). Critics from industry also viewed the
Kyoto Protocol as unfair, as some EU Member States, notably Germany and the UK, had
achieved emission reductions due to non-climate policy related political and economic
changes, and the EU could use the 1990 base year of the Protocol to its advantage.13
Japanese industry were opposed to the use of a 1990 baseline, insisting that Japanese
energy efficiency improvements and energy substitutions occurred mainly in the 1970s in
response to the two oil shocks in that decade. Hence, for Japan, it would have been more
beneficial to compare emissions with the 1970s, or by using other criteria, such as sectoral
emissions reduction potential, as a yardstick for abatement.
This debate intensified in 2009, when the discussions over a Japanese mid-term target
were mounting. On 17 March, Keidanren and its associated members published a full page
advertisement in major newspapers in Japan, arguing to re-consider the costs of greenhouse
gas emission reductions on the basis of Japan’s high level of industrial energy efficiency. It
also argued that out of the six options for a Japanese mid-term target—ranging from a 4%
increase to a 25% emissions reduction in 2020—the 4% increase of emissions would be the
most appropriate.
Given the above lines of thought, it is perhaps not surprising to see why industry
representatives in Japan have been enthusiastic about the APP, and even argue that the APP
could form the basis for a global sectoral approach (Nippon Keidanren 2007; Sameshima
2007). They emphasise the importance of the sharing of know-how and best available
technologies, and applying common benchmarks at the sector level. The APP displays
some features that fit well with Keidanren’s approach to climate change mitigation, or at
least suit their preferences better than the proposed ‘cooperative sectoral approach’ in the
UNFCCC. First, the voluntary nature of the APP matches the voluntary approach Kei-
danren has implemented since the mid-1990s.14 Second, the APP includes the US and
China, thereby mitigating competitiveness concerns of Japanese industry. Third, the
public–private nature of the APP allows business and industry representatives to directly
13 There are a number of reasons why the base year of 1990 has turned out to be advantageous for the
European Union. First, the re-unification of Germany coincided with a collapse of the former Eastern
Germany economy, with subsequent falling emissions. Second, the UK also profited from windfall emis-
sions‘ decreases after its switch from coal to gas in the early 1990s.
14 It should be noted, however, that despite the voluntary nature of Keidanren’s action plan, their com-
mitments function as if they were legally binding (Fisher 2004).
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engage in its implementation, in cooperation with governments. As task-force activities
require detailed information about sectoral emissions, technologies and mitigation poten-
tial and are thus inherently technical, the involvement of business and industry actors is
key. Fourth, the APP builds partly on existing business and industry networks, such as the
World Steel Association and the Cement Sustainability Initiative. Business actors thus see
the APP as an alternative forum through which they can influence the design of post-2012
climate policy more directly than in the UNFCCC.15
At the same time, there is some pressure to stay involved in the UN process. Although
environmental NGOs have not been as powerful and influential as in other countries
(Foljanty-Jost 2005), their voice is increasingly being heard in some parts of the govern-
ment (Fisher 2004; Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007). Both domestic and international
environmental NGOs in Japan are sceptical of the APP, instead supporting Kyoto’s targets-
and-timetables approach. In particular, they have argued that the APP is aimed at
deploying already existing technologies, and that the transfer of clean technologies requires
market incentives that the APP does not offer.16 Furthermore, there is a high degree of
public awareness of the climate change problem and the Kyoto Protocol (e.g. Cabinet
Office, Japanese Government 2001). Respondents to a poll by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs were strongly in favour of the Japanese government taking a leading role on the
issue in the international community (MOFA 2005). Finally, nationwide newspapers such
as the Asahi shinbun and the Mainichi shinbun repeatedly argue in their editorials that
staying within the UN process is the best way forward to tackle climate change.
In sum, from the perspective of interest group politics, Japan’s continued active par-
ticipation in the APP can be explained by the fact that the APP has received support from
the country’s powerful business and industry lobby. At the same time, Japan’s continuing
participation in the UNFCCC is broadly supported by other domestic actors including the
public and media, as well as environmental NGOs.
4.2 Bureaucratic politics: accommodating different ministries
A second explanation relates to politics at the government level. As we argued in Sect. 2,
Japanese climate-policy making in the 1990s has been characterised by rivalry between
METI and MOE. Since the period leading up to the Kyoto conference, the basic decision-
making procedures on climate policy in Japan have stayed the same and ‘[t]he same
ministerial battle lines have remained to this day’ (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007, p. 77).
Each ministry has its own networks with ‘interlocking self-interests among bureaucracy,
politicians and interest groups based on reciprocal political exchange’ (Oshitani 2006, p.
67–68), and each ministry is protecting its own realm of competence. Japan thus faces the
same challenges with regard to the post-2012 process that it had to deal with in the 1990s
in getting to a national position on the Kyoto Protocol.
Ever since the United States’ withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, METI, backed by
Keidanren, has argued that a future institutional framework does not necessarily have to be
similar to the Kyoto-type cap-and-trade approach. METI’s ‘Special Committee on a Future
Framework for Addressing Climate Change under Industrial Structure Council’, which is
instrumental in devising the ministry’s climate policy, published a report during COP-10 in
2004 (METI 2004), reflecting critical views of the Kyoto Protocol, and arguing that Japan’s
15 Interview with NIES researchers, 4 April 2007.
16 See NGO challenge to the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. Retrieved
January 20, 2009, from http://www.cana.net.au/documents/NGO_statement_APPCDC_100106_final.pdf.
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emission reduction target was proving to be difficult to achieve, especially for the
industrial sector. It argued that emissions were rising, and that the policies in place did not
seem to be sufficient to change this trend. Based on METI’s critical view of the Kyoto
Protocol, the future climate regime should include broad participation by all the major
emitters. In order to ensure a level playing field for the various industries, it was considered
necessary to apply common standards to international competitors. The report argued that
incentives for the development and deployment of climate-friendly technologies would be
greatest when such a common standard was shared by both industrialised countries and
developing countries (METI 2004). In addition to METI’s critical view of the Kyoto
Protocol, the ministry supports the APP as it directly involves private actors.17 Further-
more, as the host of two task forces (cement and steel), METI has a direct interest in
continuing the partnership.18
While METI drafted its ideas for future climate policy, MOE devised its own post-2012
strategy (MOE 2004). The ministry acknowledged the Kyoto Protocol’s influence on
Japan’s domestic climate policy. If no agreement had been reached in Kyoto, there would
not have been any pressure to set up the Global Warming Prevention Headquarters in 1997.
Furthermore, important parts of domestic climate policy were established after 1997, and it
might have been impossible to agree upon in the absence of the quantified emission
reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol. With a view to further mitigation action, the
report argued that some kind of stringent commitment would be necessary also in the next
round of negotiations. Although this did not necessarily have to be an absolute emission
reduction target, some kind of quantified figure was seen as necessary. The report still
welcomed any other ideas that would be more environmentally effective, thereby not
completely excluding other approaches than targets-and-timetables. At the same time, it
considered participation of other large emitters indispensable in reaching the ultimate
objective set out in Article 2 UNFCCC. While MOE thus clearly preferred the Kyoto
approach, it also did not discard other approaches like the APP altogether.
The primary concern for the third ministry involved, MOFA, has been to promote
Japan’s environmental reputation abroad. Since the 1990s, environmental policy was
considered one of the rare fields where Japan could exert international leadership. Given its
World War II history, and particularly the constitutional restriction that the country will not
hold any military power, international security and military issues have been controversial
domestically, whereas environmental diplomacy has been regarded as politically neutral.
The decision to host the Kyoto conference in 1997 fits well with this line of thinking.
MOFA’s responsibility for safeguarding Japan’s international reputation in environmental
diplomacy has been challenging given the fragmented domestic constituency (Hattori
1999). However, with respect to the APP, it has tended to side with METI, mainly to
uphold its relations with the United States. As Tiberghien and Schreurs (2007, p. 88)
explain: ‘while having ratified the Kyoto Protocol (…) the powerful METI and MOFA
have continued to search for other policy alternatives that powerful domestic interests and
Japan’s most important ally, the US, are willing to accept and support’.
Although there are some apparent differences between the ministries, there may also be
a common strategic element underlying their implicit support of Japan’s participation in
both the APP and the UN climate regime, which is related to the possibility of creating
synergies between the two (see also Vihma 2009, this issue). First, Japan views the APP as
an appropriate mechanism for getting major emitters involved in climate action (UNFCCC
17 Interview with MOE official, 7 April 2007.
18 Interview with MOE official, 7 April 2007.
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2008e). In fact, this was one of the primary reasons why METI, which holds the main
responsibility for the Partnership, decided to join.19 Although the APP does not necessarily
result in additional emission reductions in these countries, they are formally treated as
equals in the context of the Partnership. Second, even though the sectoral approach as
promoted by the APP may not be the same as the sectoral approach advocated in Japan’s
submissions to the UNFCCC, the APP could lay the groundwork for a future sectoral
approach in the climate regime, through sectoral data collection and capacity building
(UNFCCC 2008d).
In short, METI argues that Kyoto should be revisited and climate policy should be based
on technology development and deployment, which is in line with the approach taken by
the APP. MOE, on the other hand, continues to emphasise its support of the targets-and-
timetables approach taken by the Kyoto Protocol, although is not inherently opposed to
alternative approaches such as the APP. MOFA tries to maintain Japan’s reputation in
environmental diplomacy, but does not reject its participation in multiple fora if this is seen
as important for safeguarding good relations with its allies. While the Cabinet Office got
involved in ministerial deliberations before the Kyoto conference, interventions by the
office can so far only be witnessed in the debate over the mid-term target. Despite apparent
differences between these ministries, however, it can be argued that they hold the common
view that the APP could support achieving Japan’s negotiation objectives in the climate
regime.
4.3 International politics: mediating between the United States and the rest
of the world
A third perspective that can help understand Japan’s apparently ambiguous position looks
at developments and relations at the international level (cf. Fisher 2004, p. 66). Various
pressures come from other actors in the international climate regime, including the US and
the EU. Already in the creation of the climate regime, Japan ‘tried to take a middle course
between environmentally passive America and active Europe and to play a mediating role
in coordinating their different stances’ (Miyaoka 2004, p. 74).
Japan attaches great importance to keeping a good relationship with the United States,
not only in the area of climate policy, but also with respect to security and economic issues
(Inoguchi 1993; Iida 1999; Ikenberry and Inoguchi; 2003; Kawashima 2003). In the cli-
mate change negotiations, Japan originally sided with the US on several occasions,
although the countries’ positions have not always been aligned (Matsumura 2000). In the
negotiations on the UNFCCC, Japan initially opposed a system of targets-and-timetables
together with the US and China. However, it eventually accepted (non-legally binding)
common targets—i.e. the UNFCCC’s aspirational goal to stabilise emissions by 2000.
Similarly, in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, Japan was a member of the
JUSCANZ20 negotiation coalition, which originally opposed binding caps.
However, Japan has increasingly taken up an intermediary role, especially since the US
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol (Kanie 2006). For example, the compromise text of par-
agraph 38 of the Johannesburg Plan of Action, stating that ‘States that have ratified the
Kyoto Protocol strongly urge States that have not already done so to ratify it in a timely
manner’ stems originally from a Japanese proposal (Kanie 2003). The same attitude could
19 Interview with METI official, 31 March 2009.
20 The JUSCANZ bloc consisted of Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
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be witnessed at COP-6bis (2001), which was held right after the US rejection, and where
Japan’s position was of vital importance for the future of the treaty (Hamanaka 2006).
In conclusion, Japan’s foreign policy on climate change is influenced by historical and
economic ties with the US. However, compared to conventional diplomacy, Japan’s ties in
international climate politics are closer with the EU. Both the EU and Japan ratified the
Kyoto Protocol, and have been firm supporters of the treaty, although for different reasons.
Whereas the EU wants to promote the Protocol in terms of environmental integrity, Japan
has above all a symbolic tie with the treaty, given the place of its inception (Kanie 2006;
Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007). By joining the APP, Japan has been able to continue its
cooperation with the US—as well as with important Asian trade competitors/partners—on
climate change issues, while at the same time staying involved in the post-2012 discussions
under the UN climate regime.
5 Concluding thoughts
This article sought to explore the reasons for Japan’s simultaneous participation in the UN
climate regime and the Asia-Pacific Partnership, two institutional arrangements that some
have argued to be at odds with each other. Although Japan only joined the rank of the
founders of the APP at the last minute, it has been particularly active in the implementation
of the Partnership’s projects. At the same time, Japan clearly has not given up on the UN
climate regime and the treaty that bears the name of its former capital, the Kyoto Protocol.
What at first may be seen as an ambiguous decision can in fact be explained by a
number of factors, as summarised in Table 2. At the domestic level, stakeholders have
expressed both sympathy and scepticism about the APP. At the government level, the key
Ministries have pursued diverging post-2012 strategies, emphasising different design
elements of a future climate agreement. However, they seem to share the view that the APP
could support the future climate regime, by building on the sectoral activities undertaken in
the partnership. Finally, Japan’s decisions are influenced by its determination to engage
with various other actors at the international level, including the US and the EU. These
explanations at various levels provide reasonable arguments for why Japan would join, and
continue its participation in the APP, while at the same time not turning its back to the
UNFCCC negotiation process following the US rejection to the Kyoto Protocol.
Table 2 Overview of explanations of Japan’s participation in the UN climate regime and the APP
Interest group politics Keidanren opposed to Kyoto targets-and-timetables and emissions trading
NGOs sceptical of APP
Public opinion favourable to Kyoto
Bureaucratic politics METI critical of fairness and effectiveness of Kyoto; hosts APP task forces
MOE cannot turn its back on Kyoto; favours targets-and-timetables;
no rejection of APP
MOFA supportive of initiative involving the US
All ministries acknowledge possible synergies between APP and UN climate regime
International politics Japan seeking to re-engage the US in UNFCCC, and mediating between
the EU and the US
Seeking to involve major emitters (China, India)
332 H. van Asselt et al.
123
In conclusion, we would argue that Japan’s position in international climate policy is
primarily the result of trying to accommodate conflicting viewpoints at the domestic and
international levels, which is in line with previous research on Japan’s policy-making
process (Kusano 1983; Hashimoto 1999; Shindo 2001).
The impact of Japan’s dual participation on its carbon emission reductions is not yet
clear at this stage, as the APP has only recently started, and it will be difficult to attribute
specific additional emission reductions to the effects of the Partnership (Karlsson-Vin-
khuyzen and van Asselt 2009, this issue). However, there may be some synergies in terms
of data collection between the UNFCCC and the APP. While data collection under the
UNFCCC is useful for sketching an overall picture through emissions inventories, the APP
could provide practical information to enable technology transfer and deployment.
Exploiting this synergy could allow Japan to ensure complementarity between the two
approaches.
At the time of writing, the shape and substance of the post-2012 institutional framework
for international climate policy remains unclear. However, what is clear is that a sectoral
approach to climate policy constitutes a radical departure from the current approach taken
by the Kyoto Protocol (McGee and Taplin 2009, this issue), even though Japan has argued
that its ‘cooperative sectoral approach’ may be compatible with quantified national
emission reduction targets. However, sectoral approaches inevitably require the partici-
pation of private actors, which does not fit well with the character of negotiations between
sovereign nation states. Furthermore, sectoral approaches involve activities that may be too
technical to be dealt with by bureaucrats at the international level, including data collection
on emissions, projections of mitigation potential and the identification of state-of-the-art
technologies. However, there might be a role for public–private initiatives such as the APP
to support a sectoral approach within the UN climate regime to implement concrete
activities at the sector level, including sectors in both developed and developing countries.
In order for the APP and similar initiatives to constructively support the UNFCCC’s
objectives, a strong link would be required between the two. This could even take the shape
of a formal provision in a new UN climate treaty that requests countries participating in the
APP to report on progress as part of an obligation to measure, report and verify mitigation
actions. If such a synergetic institutional architecture is achieved, then Japan’s ambiguous
position towards the UNFCCC and APP might be positively evaluated.
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